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Abstract
In this paper, we derive a structural model for commuting speed. We presume that
commuting speed is chosen to minimise commuting costs, which encompass both
monetary and time costs. At faster speed levels, the monetary costs increase, but the time
costs fall. Using data from Great Britain, we demonstrate that the income elasticity of
commuting speed is approximately 0.13. The ratio of variable monetary costs to travel
time costs is estimated to be about 0.14. An implication of this is that as incomes rise
commuters choose faster modes, despite their higher monetary costs. This has been an
important factor in the growth of commuting by car in the past decades (for example,
during the 90s the percentage of work trips made by car in Britain increased from 65 per
cent to 70 per cent) and is anticipated to be relevant in the next decades for developing
countries such as China and India. With increasing congestion, the time-advantage of car
travel will decline, but unless faster public transport modes are available, there will be
little incentive to switch to public transport (unless the monetary costs decline
substantially in relation to car travel).
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Since the pioneering work of McFadden (1974), a large number of studies on
thechoiceoftravelmodehaveappearedinthetransporteconomicsliterature.
According to these studies, time and monetary costs are the structural com-
ponents of the travel mode choice, although other components (convenience
and so on) certainly have a strong inﬂuence. One ﬁnding of this travel mode
literature is that income is among the relevant explanatory variables deter-
mining mode choice (Train, 1980; Kitamura, 1989; Jara Diaz and Videla,
1989; Dargay and Hanly, 2004).
1 Low-income travellers apparently choose
a lower speed level to economise on monetary costs (Jara Diaz and Videla,
1989).
2 The implication is that the value of time depends positively on
income (Wardman, 2001) and that the chosen speed level depends positively
onincome.Oneaimofthispaperistomodelthisrelationshipmoreexplicitly.
In another strand of transport economics literature, the focus is on the
cost of transport for the user as an element in the determination of demand
(Quinet and Vickerman, 2004). For example, Littman (1999) shows in an
analysis of automobile costs in a Canadian urban context, that the time
costs are about twice the variable monetary vehicle costs. The current
study also contributes to this literature, by showing that information on
the travellers’ time and monetary costs can be derived given observations
of their chosen speed level and income.
We derive a structural model for commuting speed and identify the
relationship between monetary costs and speed level given reduced form
estimates of the income elasticity of the speed level.
3 The theoretical analy-
sis demonstrates that given an income elasticity of 0.5, the monetary costs
are a linear function of speed, but for lower elasticities, the monetary costs
are a convex function of speed.
4 When the income elasticity is (close to)
zero, then the commuter is essentially restricted in the choice of the optimal
speed level. We also demonstrate that the ratio of the variable monetary
costs to time travel costs, which is optimally chosen by the commuter by
choosing the optimal speed, depends on how the monetary costs vary
with speed. It appears that this ratio depends negatively on the marginal
monetary costs of speed. Further, it appears that when the monetary
1In stated choice models, the main consequence is that income is interacted with travel cost, and that for
lower income travellers, cost has a more negative eﬀect.
2This ﬁnding supports the literature on the trends in commuting distance, time and speeds travelled,
which essentially demonstrates that average commuting speed has increased substantially over the
last couple of decades during which we have observed strong GDP growths.
3Given information on how the monetary costs of commuting depend on the speed level (see Rouwen-
dal, 1996), the value of time can be used to predict the chosen speed level.
4In case of an income elasticity that exceeds 0.5, the monetary costs are a concave function of speed.
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the travel time costs when the speed is optimally chosen. In contrast, when
the monetary costs are a convex (concave) function of speed, the variable
monetary costs are less (more) than the time travel costs. We demonstrate
on the basis of British data that the income elasticity of speed is close to
0.13, implying that the monetary costs are a convex function of speed,
and that the variable monetary costs are less than the time travel costs.
We ﬁnd that the ratio of monetary costs to time travel costs is about 0.14
(with a standard error of 0.06).
We emphasise that our analysis focuses on commuters, and not on
travellers in general, for a number of reasons. First, value of time estimates
vary widely among diﬀerent travel purposes (Small, 1992). Commuters are
a relatively homogeneous group of travellers for which assumptions on
the value of time make more sense. Second, in the case of commuting,
the commuting distance can be instrumented avoiding problems with the
endogeneity of distance to speed, whereas this may be more diﬃcult for
other travel purposes.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we derive a structural
model for speed and show how one can estimate and identify the param-
eters ofinterestbased onreducedformestimates.In Section3,theempirical
results are presented, and in Section 4 the interpretation of the estimates in
terms of the structural model are discussed. Section 5 concludes.
2.0 The Optimal Speed Model
2.1 The structural model
In the current paper, we focus on employed individuals who earn an hourly
wage w and who aim to minimise the commuting costs, conditional on the
commuting distance. Workers’ commuting costs t are generally thought to
consist of two main components — monetary commuting costs tm and
travel time costs tc. Workers can inﬂuence both commuting costs compo-
nents by choosing the desired travel speed s. So, the commuting costs are
determined by the travel speed s conditional on the commuting distance
d. The choice of the travel speed determines the monetary and travel
time costs. Note that the commuting costs include a ﬁxed component,
which does not depend on the chosen speed level.
5 As the size of this
5The ﬁxed component can be deﬁned as the minimum monetary costs to travel a certain distance using
any travel mode within the choice set. For longer distances, the choice set does not include walking and
bicycling. Clearly, the ﬁxed component is increasing in distance.
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focus on variable commuting costs.
We assume that the monetary costs tm depend positively on the travel
speed, but also depend on spatial characteristics
6 X and distance d.
7 It is
assumed that tm is a continuous function of speed s.
8 We will assume
tm ¼ kðX;dÞs
asd, hence tm is parameterised as a power function of s
ðas > 0;kðX;dÞ > 0Þ,s otm is assumed to be increasing in the speed level
and we allow for interactive eﬀects between the speed level s, X and d.
The parameter as may be interpreted as the speed elasticity of the monetary
costs (per distance). This interactive eﬀect may exist, for example, because
at long distances, the marginal monetary costs with respect to speed may be
less than at short distances. The hourly time travel costs are assumed to be
proportional to the hourly wage w,s otc ¼ cwhc, where c > 0 and cw is the
value of time, and hc is the commuting time.
9 It may be the case that c is a
function of individual characteristics Z (but not of spatial characteristics),
so c ¼ cðZÞ. We will assume that:
cðZÞ¼az0 exp
az:Z; ð1Þ
where az0 denotes a constant.
6We assume that monetary costs do not depend on the socio-demographic characteristics of the indivi-
dual or on income. This, however, may not always be valid. One example of the former could be that
maintenance costs may be lower for men than for women, as men are typically more likely to undertake
car repairs themselves. An example of the dependency on income could be that higher income indivi-
duals have newer and more expensive cars for their reliability, comfort and status, rather than (or in
addition to) their speed.
7We may ignore the situation where the commuting costs depend negatively on speed, because this
would imply that the maximum possible speed would always be chosen.
8The standard way to study modal choice is to apply discrete choice methods. As one proceeds from one
mode to the other (for example, from bicycle to bus), a discrete jump takes place in terms of both speed
and monetary costs. In the present context we model these costs as a continuous function of speed. The
assumption that tm is continuous may be less restrictive than often thought for a number of reasons.
First, commuters may choose from a number of mode choices, which reﬂect diﬀerent speed levels.
Second, many commuters combine several private and public transport modes for a trip (such as
walking and underground; train and taxi) or use a combination of modes for diﬀerent trips (Van
Exel and Rietveld, 2004). Third, car drivers inﬂuence the speed level by changing departure time to
and from work. Fourth, given the choice of the car, the monetary costs increase with speed in a
continuous way through fuel costs, accident costs and ﬁnes which all depend on the speed level
(Rouwendal, 1996; Rienstra and Rietveld, 1996; Verhoef and Rouwendal, 2001; Gander, 1985;
Rotemberg, 1985).
9Note that this functional form implies that the value of travel time elasticity is equal to one. Empirical
studies suggest that this elasticity is less than one although the elasticity for commuting is usually
thought to be much higher than for non-commuting time (Small et al., 1999; Mackie et al., 2003;
AHCG, 1999). A recent study by Fosgerau (2005b), however, ﬁnds a unit elasticity and suggests
that previous studies may be underestimates. The consequences of the unit assumption will be
discussed at the end of Section 4.
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total variable commuting costs t can be written as:
t ¼

cðZÞw
s
þ kðX;dÞs
as

d; ð2Þ
where the ﬁrst term between brackets denotes the travel time costs per
distance unit and the second term denotes the monetary costs per distance
unit. Conditional on the commuting distance and the wage, the employee
chooses the optimal speed s
  by minimising total commuting costs. The
ﬁrst-order condition ð@t=@s
  ¼ 0Þ implies then that:
10
tm
tc
¼
1
as
; if s ¼ s
 : ð3Þ
Hence, given the optimal speed level, the ratio of the (variable) monetary
costs to the time costs is equal to the inverse of the speed elasticity of the
monetary costs. Note that this ratio does not depend on any other variable
such as the speed level or the wage, because the speed level, and therefore,
this ratio are optimally chosen.
In the special case that the monetary costs are a linear function of the
speed level, then as ¼ 1. This implies that in this special case tm ¼ tc,s o
the optimal speed is chosen such that the time travel costs are equal to
the variable monetary travel costs. Now suppose that the monetary costs
are a convex (concave) function of speed, conditional on distance, so
as > 1ðas < 1Þ. In this case, the variable monetary costs exceed (are less
than) the time costs. In the current paper, we will estimate as, which enables
us to estimate the ratio of monetary costs to time costs.
To derive how the optimally chosen speed depends on Z, X, d and w,w e
proceed by presuming a certain functional form for kðX;dÞ. We will
suppose that:
kðX;dÞ¼exp
a0þaxX þad logd : ð4Þ
So the parameter ad is the distance elasticity of the monetary costs per
distance, and ad þ 1 is the distance elasticity of the monetary costs.
11
Given (3), kðX;dÞs
as ¼ð 1=asÞcðZÞw=s and using (1) and (4), the optimally
10The assumption that as exceeds zero guarantees that the second-order condition of the worker’s mini-
misation problem is fulﬁlled in the optimum, which guarantees a ﬁnite speed solution.
11It may be thought that ad must exceed  1, because the total monetary costs must be an increasing
function of distance d. However, ad may be less than  1, because total monetary costs consist of a
ﬁxed component, which does not depend on speed, and a variable component. In case that the
ﬁxed monetary costs increase as a function of distance, then the variable monetary costs may decrease
in distance, so ad may be less than  1.
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  can be written as:
logs
  ¼
½logaz0 þ azZ   a0 þ logw   axX   ad logd   logas 
1 þ as
: ð5Þ
One of the main implications of (5) is that the optimal speed depends
positively on the wage (since as > 0).
12
2.2 The reduced form model
In order to estimate the structural parameters of (5), we estimate a reduced
form model and to do so we also introduce unobserved heterogeneity. It is
natural to assume that individuals deviate from each other in unobserved
ways not taken into account by equation (5). This implies that:
logs
  ¼ b0 þ bxX þ bzZ þ bw logw þ bd logd þ u; ð6Þ
where b are reduced form parameters and u is random error.
2.2.1 Identiﬁcation
Identiﬁcation of the structural parameters is straightforward. Given (5) and
(6), it appears that:
bz ¼ az=ð1 þ asÞ; ð7Þ
bx ¼  ax=ð1 þ asÞ; ð8Þ
bw ¼ 1=ð1 þ asÞ; ð9Þ
bd ¼  ad=ð1 þ asÞ; ð10Þ
It can be easily seen that bw is the income elasticity of speed and because
as > 0, it follows that bw < 1. In the case where the monetary costs are a
linear function of speed, so as ¼ 1, then bw ¼ 1=2. In the case where the
monetary costs are a convex function (as > 1), then 0 < bw < 0:5. Only
when as goes to inﬁnity, so the commuters are fully constrained in their
choice of speed, then bw ¼ 0.
13 In the case of a concave function,
bw > 0:5. The reduced form parameters can be estimated by means of a
regression of the logarithm of the speed level s on the logarithm of the
wage w, the characteristics X and Z and the logarithm of commuting
12In line with this statement there is some empirical evidence that given the choice of a car, those with
high incomes travel faster (Rienstra and Rietveld, 1996; Fosgerau, 2005a). In Section 3, we will
examine this statement more carefully.
13One may argue that congestion may fully constrain car drivers when the whole trip is congested and
there are no alternatives. For short distances, it is more likely that the whole trip is congested (such as
in the centre of London), but in this case alternative modes are often available (for example, walking,
underground and so on).
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14 Given the reduced form estimates of bz, bx, bw and bd, the
‘structural’ parameters az, ad, as and ax are identiﬁed when Z and X do
not include the same variables.
15 Clearly:
az ¼ bz=bw; ð11Þ
ad ¼  bd=bw; ð12Þ
ax ¼  bx=bw; ð13Þ
as ¼ 1=bw   1: ð14Þ
The above results make sense.
16 For example, az can be interpreted as the
eﬀect of Z on (the logarithm of) the value of time (see (1)), which is propor-
tional to the wage. Hence, the speed level will be optimally chosen such that
az is equal to the ratio of the marginal eﬀect of Z on speed to the marginal
eﬀect of (the logarithm of) the wage on speed (see (11)).
2.2.2 Comparative statics
Given the reduced form parameters, one can easily estimate the eﬀects of Z,
X, d and w on the monetary costs, presuming that individuals have chosen
the optimal commuting speed. Note that tm ¼ tc=as, so logtm ¼ logtc  
logas. It follows that:
logtm ¼ð 1=bw   1ÞbzZ   b0   bxX þ½ 1   bw logw
þ½ 1   bd logd   logð 1 þ 1=bwÞ u; ð15Þ
so:
@ logtm=@ logw ¼ 1   bw; ð16Þ
@ logtm=@X ¼  bx; ð17Þ
@ logtm=@ logd ¼ 1   bd; ð18Þ
@ logtm=@Z ¼ð 1=bw   1Þbz: ð19Þ
14As we will argue later on, the endogeneity of distance should be taken into account.
15As noted earlier, there may be cases where tm includes income. However, we assume these to be of
minor importance and thus omit them. For example, when monetary costs include schedule delay
costs, then it may be argued that the wage enters tm because wage may aﬀect schedule delay costs.
There is some evidence that for this reason tm is a negative function of wage w (Emmerink and Van
Beek, 1997). We do not explicitly allow for that, so our estimates of as may be slightly biased upwards.
16For environmental characteristics (such as the urban density), it is implausible that they aﬀect directly
the monetary value of time, so they are not included in Z. For some individual characteristics one may
argue that these should be included in both Z and X, because they may inﬂuence the value of time but
also the monetary variable costs, so for these variables the structural parameters are not identiﬁed.
Suppose that the variable XZ is in X and Z. In this case, bxz ¼ð az   axÞ=ð1 þ asÞ.
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X, Z, d and w on (the logarithm of) the monetary costs. For example, the
reduced form estimates bx can be interpreted as minus the marginal eﬀect
of X on logtm (see (17)). The marginal eﬀect of Z has the same sign as bz,
because 1=bw   1 ¼ as > 0. Recall that we have shown that if the commuter
chooses the optimal speed, then tc ¼ astm (see (3)), so it follows that
t ¼ð as þ 1Þtm and thus logt ¼ logð1 þ asÞþlogtm. Consequently, the
(partial) eﬀect of any exogenous variable on the logarithm of the commuting
costs logt is equal to the (partial) eﬀect on the logarithm of the monetary
commuting costs logtm.
Note that @tm=@s ¼ t
0
m ¼ astm=s, hence:
logt
0
m ¼ logaz0 þ bzð1=bw   2ÞZ þ logw
  2½b0 þ bxX þ bw logw þ½ bd   1
2 logd þ u ; ð20Þ
so:
@ logt
0
m=@ logw ¼ 1   2bw; ð21Þ
@ logt
0
m=@X ¼  2bx; ð22Þ
@ logt
0
m=@ logd ¼ 1   2bd; ð23Þ
@ logt
0
m=@Z ¼ð 1=bw   2Þbz: ð24Þ
Hence, we are able to calculate how the optimally chosen marginal
monetary costs t
0
m depend on w, Z, X and d.
17 In Table 1, we have
summarised the eﬀects.
It appears from Table 1 that the reduced form estimates (bz, bx, bw and
bd) can be readily interpreted. For example, the eﬀect of a variable Xi on
logs can be interpreted as (the negative of) the eﬀect of this variable Xi
on the logarithm of the commuting costs, logt. The implication is, of
course, that if in an area the average speed is, about 10 per cent lower,
for example, due to speed restrictions which require commuters to drive
at 45mph instead of 50mph, then the implied additional commuting
costs are equal to 10 per cent when the speed is optimally chosen. However
if commuters in the area with the speed restrictions of 45mph drive at
50mph, then the implied additional monetary costs are equal to
ax ¼  bxð1 þ asÞ (see the last column of Table 1). Speed restrictions
imply a convex monetary costs function (which may be presumed to be a
continuous function of speed, because the probability of being ﬁned is a
continuous function of speed), so as > 1, so ax is at least twice bx. For
example, when as ¼ 5, the implied monetary costs of driving 55mph
would be 50 per cent higher than when driving 50mph.
17Recall that @t=@s
  ¼ 0, so t
0 ¼ 0 and t
0
m ¼  t
0
c.
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muting costs with respect to speed can be found. The interesting hypotheses
here are whether 1   2bw ¼ 0, so bw ¼ 0.5, and whether 1   2bd ¼ 0, so
bd ¼ 0.5. In the case that bw ¼ 0.5, the implication is that the wage has
no eﬀect on the marginal monetary costs. Similarly, if bd ¼ 0.5, then the
distance has no eﬀect on the marginal monetary costs.
3.0 Empirical Results
3.1 The data
The empirical analysis involves estimating equation (6). This requires
information on commuting speed, commuting time, the wage rate and
other variables that inﬂuence choice of travel speed, preferably on the
individual level. We use data from National Travel Surveys (NTS) for
Great Britain. The NTS is based on a 7-day travel diary for a sample of
private households and includes information on distance, time, purpose
and mode for all trips made by each household member. It also includes
data on a large number of socio-economic and demographic characteristics
relating to the individuals and households.
Our analysis employs data for the six years 1989–1991 and 1999–2001.
Using data for three consecutive years insures that the sample is represen-
tative of the British population and the two 3-year periods increases the
variation in the variables, as well as providing the possibility of examining
changes in behaviour over time. The analysis is based on individuals who
report work trips by all modes on a given day.
18 Thus all stages of the
Table 1
Comparative Statics: Marginal Eﬀects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
logs logt logt
0
m logtmjs logtcjs
Z bz ð1=bw   1Þbz ð1=bw   2Þbz – az
X bx  bx  2bx ax –
logw bw 1   bw 1   2bw –1
logd bd 1   bd 1   2bd ad 1
Notes: logt
0
m ¼ @ logtm=@s; logt and logt
0
m are determined given the optimally chosen speed level.
In the last two columns, the eﬀect is reported on the monetary and time costs conditional on the
speed level. When the X andZ variables are discrete dummyvariables, then the eﬀect ofa variable
with eﬀect of size g is equal to expg   1, which is approximately equal to g when g is small.
18Diary day 7 is chosen because walk trips of less than 1 mile are not included on the other days.
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of commuting time, distance and speed. In our sample, the average
commuting time per working day is 43 minutes (s.d: ¼ 34), the average
commuting distance is 15 miles (s.d: ¼ 19) and the average commuting
speed is 18 miles per hour (s.d: ¼ 12).
19
A most important explanatory variable in our model is the wage rate.
Information on the hourly wage is not collected in the NTS, so the
annual gross income of the individual is used instead.
20 Other explanatory
variables included in the model relate to characteristics of the individual,
the household to which they belong, and the area in which they live.
Characteristics of the individual are gender, age, whether they are full- or
part-time employed and whether they are employed or self-employed.
The characteristics of the household include the number of adults in the
household and whether or not there are children in the household. The
location variables are the population density and the population of muni-
cipality where the individual resides. Apart from income and distance, all
explanatory variables are binary variables equal to 1 if the condition
holds, and zero otherwise. The estimation thus requires one variable in
each group to be omitted and the coeﬃcients of the remaining variables
are interpreted in relation to the reference group. A dummy variable
equal to one for the 1999–2001 data and zero for the 1989–1991 data is
also included to allow for a diﬀerence in intercept over the 10-year period.
21
3.2 The estimation procedure
In the theoretical analysis, it is assumed that the commuting distance is
exogenously given. This assumption is unlikely to hold in the data we
analyse. For example, it may be the case that some individuals may have
a preference for a faster (or slower) travel mode (such as the car) for reasons
unrelated to speed (such as convenience) and are therefore more likely to
commute faster (or slower) than other individuals. Given higher speed
levels, these individuals are more likely to accept longer distances a priori.
19The coeﬃcient of variation (the standard deviation divided by the mean) for speed equals 0.66, for
time equals 0.79 and for distance equals 1.26. Hence, the variation in the chosen speed level is
relatively small compared to commuting time and particularly distance. This makes sense as those
with a long commuting distance travel at higher speeds, explaining why the coeﬃcient of variation
of time is less than the coeﬃcient of distance.
20Income is given in 20 income groups in the NTS. The individual’s income is taken as the mid-point of
the group, converted to year 2000 prices using the retail price index. Note that we use gross income
instead of net income (after tax) as this variable was not available. The main consequence is that
the standard estimates ai are somewhat lower than reported here.
21The variables speed, income and distance enter the model in logarithmic form, so that the coeﬃcients
relating to income and distance are in elasticity form, which are constant by this speciﬁcation.
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maximum speed levels than others. Individuals face diﬀerent degrees of
physical and legal constraints which aﬀect the maximum costs of speed
(for example, congestion, maximum speed restrictions).
22 If individuals
are constrained at diﬀerent levels, then it means that those who are able
to travel at higher speeds without exceeding the maximum speed restriction
may accept jobs at longer distances ceteris paribus. Further, it is diﬃcult in
the empirical analysis to control fully for the variation in the spatial envir-
onment (for example, supply of public transport, congestion, motorway
accessibility, and so on) which may cause the commuting distance to
become endogenous. If commuting distance is endogenous, it will be
correlated with the error term so that the OLS estimates of (6) will not
be consistent. Consistent estimates can be obtained by using an instrumen-
tal variables (IV) estimation procedure. As an instrument for commuting
distance, we use the skill level of the job. The skill level should not inﬂuence
the optimal speed conditional on income, but will inﬂuence the density of
acceptable jobs, and therefore the commuting distance. It is generally
true that jobs involving higher skill levels are more specialised and therefore
less common, implying longer commuting distances (Rouwendal and
Rietveld, 1994).
3.3 The reduced form estimates of speed
Both OLS and IV estimates are presented in Table 2, along with goodness-
of-ﬁt and test statistics. The Hausman Test for the exogeneity of the
distance variable, shown at the bottom of the table, is 2.398, so that exo-
geneity cannot be rejected at the 0.10 probability level. This implies that
OLS provides consistent estimates (although the power of the test may
not be high). In addition, examination of the residuals shows that these
are approximately normally distributed. The estimated parameters are
very similar for both models, and in most cases are not statistically diﬀerent
from each other. In general, the reduced form estimated coeﬃcients are in
accordance with the literature on transport mode choice (Madan and
Groenhout, 1987; Jara Diaz and Videla, 1989; Asensio, 2002).
23 The
22Note that maximum speed restrictions are, from an economic point of view, not an absolute
constraint, since people can, and do, exceed maximum speed levels at the risk of paying a ﬁne
(Gander, 1985). The point is, however, that some individuals face diﬀerent maximum speed
restrictions.
23The reduced form estimates are broadly consistent with those of Fosgerau (2005a), who analyses the
speed of car drivers who also travel for diﬀerent purposes other than commuting, arguing a positive
relationship between speed and income due to the presence of speed limit ﬁnes. In this study for
Denmark, the income elasticity is smaller than we ﬁnd (about 0.02 to 0.03) and the distance elasticity
is about 0.20.
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the elasticity of speed with respect to distance as 0.49 (OLS) and 0.40
(IV). Statistically, there is little diﬀerence between the estimates.
The characteristics of residential location are shown to be highly
signiﬁcant with both estimation procedures. Commuting speed declines
as population density increases, and also declines as the population of
the municipality increases. Both of these reﬂect the higher congestion in
built up areas and the availability and more prevalent use of public
transport. Regarding the other variables, we ﬁnd that commuting speed
Table 2
Parameter Estimates and Statistical Tests. Dependent Variable¼Log Speed
OLS Estimation IV Estimation
Coeﬃcient s.e. Prob. Coeﬃcient s.e. Prob. Mean
Constant 0.396 0.030 0.000 0.702 0.204 0.001 0.00
bw
Log Income 0.088 0.008 0.000 0.126 0.026 0.000 2.51
bd
Log Distance 0.492 0.004 0.000 0.403 0.059 0.000 4.31
bz
Woman  0.047 0.011 0.000  0.064 0.016 0.000 0.42
Age 18–34 years 0.002 0.010 0.826 0.014 0.013 0.275 0.39
Age >65 years  0.071 0.040 0.078  0.071 0.041 0.084 0.02
Part-time Employed 0.037 0.017 0.029 0.010 0.024 0.666 0.15
Self-employed 0.042 0.025 0.095 0.026 0.028 0.358 0.04
1 Adult in household  0.054 0.017 0.001  0.077 0.023 0.001 0.10
3þ Adults in household  0.007 0.015 0.651  0.010 0.016 0.527 0.12
Children in household 0.018 0.010 0.091 0.013 0.011 0.244 0.37
bx
Population density
<1 persons/hectare 0.072 0.020 0.000 0.068 0.020 0.001 0.10
15–39.9 persons/hectare  0.039 0.013 0.003  0.054 0.016 0.001 0.35
40þ persons/hectare  0.141 0.016 0.000  0.162 0.021 0.000 0.24
Municipality size
London  0.328 0.018 0.000  0.324 0.019 0.000 0.12
Other Metro Areas  0.085 0.016 0.000  0.091 0.017 0.000 0.14
Cities over 100k  0.051 0.014 0.000  0.058 0.015 0.000 0.23
Villages under 3k 0.068 0.020 0.001 0.092 0.026 0.000 0.09
Dummy 1999–2001  0.006 0.011 0.596 0.006 0.013 0.675 0.34
Observations 9361 9361
Adjusted R
2 0.671 0.655
F[18,9345] 1060.7 Prob¼0.000 988.7 Prob¼0.000
Akaike Criterion 1.320 1.365
Hausman test F-statistic 2.398 Prob¼0.122
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290is lower for women and for the over-65s. The part-time employed and the
self-employed appear to travel at higher speeds than the full-time employed
according to the OLS estimates, but the IV estimates indicate that this eﬀect
is spurious. Individuals who are the sole adult in the household travel
slower than those in households with two or more adults. Those with chil-
dren appear to travel faster, but not signiﬁcantly so. The results show
further that commuting speed has not increased over the decade, ceteris
paribus.
24
4.0 The Structural Parameters and the Eﬀect on the
Commuting Costs
Given the reduced form estimates, we are able to calculate the structural
parameters as, ad, az and ax (see Table 3). We will discuss the IV estimates
in more detail, but note that the OLS estimates tend to give somewhat
higher values, because the point estimate of bw is somewhat smaller. We
have seen that bw ¼ 0.13 (s.e: ¼ 0:03), it appears therefore that the
speed elasticity of monetary costs as ¼ 6:9 (s.e: ¼ 1:4, see equation (14)),
so as > 1. The main consequence is that the monetary costs are a
convex function of speed. As as is quite large, the marginal cost of
commuting is extremely high at higher speed levels. We believe this
makes sense. At certain higher levels of speed, commuters are essentially
constrained due to speed limits and the increased risk of an accident.
Further, fuel costs rise steeply with speed. The estimates also imply that
at low speed levels, the marginal costs are close to zero, this also makes
sense. For example, the additional monetary costs of switching from
walking to the use of a bicycle (which increases the speed level by a
factor four) are modest.
Recall that by choosing an optimal speed level, the ratio of variable
monetary costs to time costs is equal to a
 1
s . It follows that the ratio of
variable monetary costs to time costs is equal to 0.14 (s.e: ¼ 0:06). Such a
result is consistent with the mode choice literature where it is found that
exogenous travel time changes in transport modes are seen as a more
24A number of other models were estimated, which conﬁrm the robustness of the results. For example,
we have estimated a number of models with OLS allowing income and distance to interact and to
allow for a non-constant distance elasticity. The interaction appears to be small in value and statisti-
cally insigniﬁcant. Further, the distance elasticity declines slightly with distance. The only exception
are speciﬁcations that do not include the logarithm of distance but merely distance. The latter
speciﬁcation is however mis-speciﬁed as, for example, evidenced by a much lower R
2.
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291relevant factor than monetary costs (for example, Madan and Groenhout,
1987; Asensio, 2002). It is also consistent with the study by Littman (1999)
that uses a diﬀerent methodology in a diﬀerent context, but which reports
also that the time costs are much larger than the variable monetary costs.
Recall that the parameter ad can be interpreted as the distance elasticity
of the monetary costs per distance. The results imply that ad is negative and
is equal to  3.1 (s.e: ¼ 0.7),
25 see equation (12). Hence at longer distances,
Table 3
Structural Parameters and Eﬀects of Variables on Commuting Costs
(1) (2) (3)
Commuting costs Monetary costs Value of time
Estimate s.e. Coeﬃcient s.e. Coeﬃcient s.e.
as
Speed 6.944 1.401
Log Income 0.874 0.026
ad
Log Distance 0.597 0.059  3.141 0.691
az
Woman  0.444 0.222  0.508 0.254
Age 18–34 years 0.097 0.090 0.111 0.103
Age >65 years  0.492 0.284  0.563 0.325
Part-time Employed 0.069 0.166 0.079 0.190
Self-employed 0.180 0.194 0.206 0.222
1 Adult in household  0.534 0.319  0.611 0.365
3þ Adults in household  0.069 0.111  0.079 0.127
Children in household 0.090 0.076 0.103 0.087
Population density ax
<1 persons/hectare  0.068 0.020  0.540 0.159
15–39.9 persons/hectare 0.016 0.429 0.127 0.054
40þ persons/hectare 0.162 0.021 1.286 0.167
Municipality size
London 0.324 0.019 2.571 0.151
Other Metro Areas 0.091 0.017 0.722 0.135
Cities over 100k 0.058 0.015 0.460 0.119
Villages under 3k  0.092 0.026  0.730 0.206
Dummy 1999–2001  0.006 0.013  0.048 0.103
Note: In column (1), the (marginal) eﬀects on the logarithm of the (variable) commuting costs
(given the optimal speed level) are reported, using Table 1, column 2. Columns (2) and (3)
report the structural parameters which can be interpreted as the (marginal) eﬀects on the
logarithm of the (variable) monetary commuting costs and value of time respectively.
25The standard error is calculated using the delta method, see Goldberger (1991).
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which is consistent with the observation that commuters at longer distances
travel much faster (as we have argued before, the ﬁxed monetary costs will
probably increase with distance, so ad þ 1, the distance elasticity of the
variable monetary costs may be negative). One may argue that it is more
insightful to focus on the eﬀect of distance on the (variable) commuting
costs given the optimal speed level. Employing (18), it appears that the
derived distance elasticity of the commuting costs is about 0.6 (see Table
3). It appears further (see (23)), that the derived distance elasticity of the
marginal monetary commuting costs is 0.19 (s.e: ¼ 0.12), which is statisti-
cally not diﬀerent from zero at the 5 per cent signiﬁcance level (of course,
themarginaltotal commutingcostsare zerobyassumption). Consequently,
the eﬀect of speed on the monetary costs does not appear to depend on
distance, when the speed is optimally chosen.
The parameter ax measures the eﬀect of background characteristics on
(the logarithm of) the monetary commuting costs. For example, it follows
(using (13)), that in London the implied (marginal) monetary costs are
much higher. Ceteris paribus (so given the same arbitrarily chosen speed
level), the (marginal) monetary costs are about 13 times higher
ðexpð2:57Þ¼13Þ than in small cities. One may again argue however that
it is less insightful to focus on the eﬀect of X given arbitrarily chosen
speed levels, because the optimally chosen speed level is diﬀerent in
London than elsewhere. In London (compared to municipalities with a
size between 3 and 100k inhabitants and given the lower optimally
chosen speed level) the marginal monetary costs are ‘only’ about 2 times
higher (see equation (22), bx ¼ 0.324 and expð0:648Þ¼1:91), whereas the
monetary costs are ‘only’ 1.38 times higher (expð0:324Þ¼1:38, see (17)).
Hence, we interpret the results as follows. Given the same speed level, the
(marginal) monetary costs are much higher in London than elsewhere.
Subsequently, the commuters choose lower speed levels in London than
elsewhere to decrease the marginal monetary costs. Still, in the optimum,
the marginal monetary costs are higher in London, since the marginal
beneﬁts are decreasing in speed, so the marginal beneﬁts are higher in
London. One of the consequences is that the implied variable monetary
costs are about 30 to 40 per cent higher in London given the chosen
speed level.
The parameter az measures the eﬀect of Z on (the logarithm of) the
value of time cðZÞ. It follows that the value of time of women is about
40 per cent less ðexpð 0:508Þ 1 ¼  0:40Þ than for men, ceteris paribus,
but other individual characteristics have no statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect.
Note that because the speed elasticity of the monetary costs as is large
(that is, the monetary costs are a convex function of speed), a relatively
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293small value for bz has a large eﬀect on az (for women, bz is  0.064, see
Table 2). This implies that relatively large diﬀerences in the value of time
between individuals have little eﬀect on the chosen speed level.
26
5.0 Conclusion
In this paper, we have estimated a structural model of optimal speed choice,
which can be derived from a reduced form regression of speed on income
and distance. The model has been applied to the UK for the years 1989–
1991 and 1999–2001. Our estimates imply that the elasticity of speed with
respect to income is approximately 0.13, and that the total travel costs
mainly consist of time costs. For the average commuter, the variable
monetary costs are estimated to be about 14 per cent of the total variable
costs. An implication of this is that as incomes rise commuters choose
faster modes, despite their higher monetary costs. This has been an impor-
tant factor in the growth of commuting by car in the past decades. For
example, during the 90s the percentage of work trips made by car in Britain
increased from 65 per cent to 70 per cent. However, with increasing
congestion, the time-costs of car travel will increase, but unless faster
public transport modes are available or their monetary costs decline sub-
stantially in relation to car travel, there will be little incentive to switch
to public transport. We believe that our results are especially of interest
for developing countries such as China and India where the anticipated
increase in income and the growth in car ownership is substantially
higher than in developed countries. The results suggest that to address
the issue of increasing congestion, it is particularly relevant to develop a
fast and eﬃcient public transport system.
We ﬁnd that the monetary costs of speed are a convex function of speed:
at high levels of speed, monetary costs increase strongly (for example, due
to the increased risk of accidents, ﬁnes and so on), so the marginal costs
26As stated above, the identiﬁcation of the structural parameters relies on the assumption of a unity
elasticity for the value of travel time with respect to income. Let us suppose now that the elasticity
is much less than one, about 0.6 as reported by Small et al. (1999). In this case it can be seen that
the value of all structural parameters are about 40 per cent less, except as which would be 3.8 so
about 50 per cent less. Although the structural parameters are therefore strongly aﬀected, the main
conclusions remain essentially identical: as would still be much larger than one, so the monetary
cost function is convex; the ratio of variable monetary costs to travel time costs is 0.26, so the time
travel costs are much larger than the monetary costs. Note that the reduced form estimates are not
aﬀected and that all marginal eﬀects reported in Table 1 are not aﬀected (except those with respect
to income).
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time between individuals have little eﬀect on the chosen speed level. Finally,
it appears that the (marginal) monetary costs of speed are a positive
function of the population density and municipality size, ceteris paribus.
For example, in London, the variable monetary costs of speed are about
13 times as large as in small cities, ceteris paribus. Nevertheless, given the
optimally chosen speed level, which is much lower in London due to
speed restrictions and congestion which increases the risk of accidents
(Verhoef and Rouwendal, 2001), the variable marginal costs are ‘only’ 30
to 40 per cent larger.
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